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                 A brief note on Secured P- Grid 
 
This document talks briefly about making the current P- Grid implementation secure. We 
realize the following two requirements which we feel are essential for making 
communication on P-Grid the most secure one. 
 
1. Authentication: Both peers on either side have to authenticate each other before 
actually starting exchanging any P-Grid related messages. This authentication is done 
using digital certificates.  
 
2. Encryption: Once authentication is done, all the communication should be done in a 
secure way. Any unauthorized person should not be able to listen to the messages. This 
can be done by encrypting the messages before transmission and decrypting after 
received on the other end.  
 
After a decent study of various security mechanisms (like Password-Based Cryptography 
Standard- PKCS#5 ...), we found that SSL Sockets handle both the above tasks perfectly. 
Moreover, it is very much integrated into Java. It is a standard technology and widely 
used because it has lot of built-in security related functionalities, which otherwise have to 
be implemented manually which might be error-prone.  
 
All the communication in the secured P-Grid takes place on top of Java SSL Sockets. In 
the following, we discuss about how the SSL Sockets work and how they meet our 
requirements and what a participating peer in P-Grid has to do before running the client.  
 
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol 
 
The primary goal of the SSL protocol (which is renamed to Transport Layer Security 
(TLS)) is to provide privacy and reliability between two communicating parties. SSL 
provides a secure alternative to the standard TCP/IP sockets protocol. The applications 
using SSL have to specify additional cryptographic information to the SSL layer. SSL 
provides  
 
1. Authenticity- An SSL session involves server authentication and optional client 
authentication. Mutual authentication implies that information is guaranteed to be 
exchanged only between the intended parties. The authentication mechanism is 
based on public-key signatures and digital certificates. These digital certificates 
can be either self-signed certificates or certificates obtained from external third 
party certificate authorities (CAs). For P-Grid, we use self-signed certificates 
because it avoids the need for contacting the CAs and it is sufficient for the initial 
said requirements for secured P-Grid.  
2. Privacy- After initial handshake, a secret key is defined which will be used to 
encrypt and decrypt all the messages on the connection. Since it is based on 
symmetric key, cryptographic operations are much faster.  
3. Data Integrity- The SSL connection is reliable. The message transport includes a 
message-integrity check based on a secure hash function. So there is virtually no 
possibility of data corruption without detection.  
 
Implementation details 
 
A node participating in communication through SSL has to provide digital certificates 
and the public-private key pairs to the SSL layer which will be submitted to the remote 
peers during authentication phase. More over, it has to specify the certificates in which it 
trusts in which helps the SSL layer to authenticate the remote peers. Authentication of 
remote peer will be successful if and only if at least one of the certificates in the 
certificate chain provided by remote peer match local peer's trusted certificates.  
 
Digital certificates and public- private key management of a user on a host is typically 
done through KeyStores. A TrustStore is a regular keystore to specify what kind of 
certificates and CAs the peer trusts in. Thus, each peer initializes its own key store and 
trust stores before any application using SSL is run and specifies the locations of these 
files to the application along with the passwords to access them. Keystores and 
Truststores are created by a tool called keytool. Each keystore is protected by a single 
password. Either the same or a different password can be used for private key 
information in the store. 
 
The working of SSL and the concept of keystores is demonstrated in Figure. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 System setup for SSL 
Without loss of generality, assume that peer-1 starts the communication first to peer-2 
(peer-1 as the client and peer-2 as the server). The following sequence of activities takes 
place in the setup as part of the authentication and communication. 
1. Peer-1’s KeyStore (i.e., KeyStore-1) is accessed via the password and certificate 
is retrieved and sent to peer-2. 
2. Peer-2 checks the certificate against its TrustStore (i.e., TurstStore-2). If it 
matches, peer-1 is authenticated by peer-2. 
3. Then peer-2 is authenticated by peer-1 similarly. A certificate from Keystore-2 is 
sent to peer-1 and is checked against TrustStore-1 for verifying the authentication. 
4. Once mutual authentication is done, a secret key is shared between the peers, 
which is used for encryption and decryption of the following communication 
messages. This is done automatically by the SSL layer.  
 
Why it is secured? 
A digital certificate contains the public key information along with some identity 
information (like name, institution name, etc). It will also have the digitally signed hash 
of the contents (including the public key) at the end i.e., a hash function is applied on the 
contents and the resulting hash is encrypted using the CA’s private key (OR by its own 
private key in case of self-signed certificates) to create the digital signature of the 
certificate. On the receiving end, this encrypted hash is decrypted using the said public-
key and is checked with the hash of the received contents (the same hash algorithm is 
applied at the receiving end too). If the check fails, the certificate is rejected. 
 
• Attack-1: An outsider sniffing the traffic obtains the certificate. 
So since private key is secret and never transmitted on network, there is no way to 
create such a signature knowing a certificate.  
 
• Attack-2: Outsider obtains both the certificate and its signature just by 
sniffing the traffic.  
There is no way one illegally takes advantage, because the SSL requires the client 
to send a random message along with its digital signature to the server (in addition 
to the digitally signed certificate) as part of authentication.  And generating such a 
signature requires the private key which is never transmitted on network. 
 
• Attack-3: Outsider, after obtaining the certificate and the signature, may 
advertise that he is already member of the secured network expecting others 
to join to him. 
This does not pose a significant threat as the later part of connection setup needs 
sharing some random numbers secretly. Then the server has to encrypt those 
numbers with its private key which will be decrypted by the client with the 
server’s public key. Since an outsider can never get the private key, this step fails. 
In SSL, failure of even a single step in the connection establishment phase rejects 
the whole connection request. 
  
How it is done for P-Grid 
 
P-Grid security is based on self-signed certificates. So a super user or administrator of the 
secured network creates a KeyStore file running keytool. This file along with the 
password is shared to all the participants by the creator out-of-band either via email or 
some other mechanism. The same store acts as both key and trust stores on all peers i.e., 
KeyStore-1=TurstStore-1=KeyStore-2=TrustStore-2 with the same password for all. So 
to participate in the private P-Grid network, a peer should have above store file and the 
password to open that. Both should be supplied to the P-Grid client running on the peer. 
It is to be noted that all peers will have same public and private key pairs in this setup. 
